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The US economy experienced a historic household spending boom leading up to the Great Recession. We labeled this period from the mid-1980s through 2007 as the "Consumer Age" in Cynamon and Fazzari (2008, 2012a) . This boom provided much of the demand growth that put US unemployment on a declining trend and fueled global demand through the US trade deficit.
Another important trend during this period may seem paradoxical in retrospect: income growth across most of the population stagnated and inequality rose dramatically. How could consumption spending rise so quickly with stagnant income growth over much of the income distribution? To ask the question is to answer it: American households, outside of those in the top of the income distribution, went on an extended borrowing binge. Household debt relative to after-tax income rose to unprecedented levels. And it was the resulting financial fragility that caused both residential construction and broader measures of household spending to plummet, leading to the most severe economic contraction in the US since the Great Depression. This paper considers how rising inequality, household spending, and consumer debt interacted during the Consumer Age. We disaggregate demand, income, and saving across two broad groups, the bottom 95 percent and top 5 percent of the income distribution, to explore the source of the trends in household finance that fueled stimulative demand growth, but also generated financial fragility. Our analysis is based on measures of household demand and saving rates that integrate the national income and product accounts (NIPA) statistics on personal consumption expenditure with residential construction spending, following the approach developed in Cynamon and Fazzari (2013) . Our measure of the saving rate plummeted and indebtedness exploded for the bottom 95 percent, as their income share declined. The indebtedness and saving of the top 5 percent have virtually no trend during the same period. Our calculations show that a return to a mid-1980s saving rate for the bottom 95 percent group, the end of a period in which household leverage seemed stable and sustainable, would have required a withdrawal of demand equal to about 8 percent of GDP by the mid-2000s. Furthermore, the demand accounted for by the cumulative decline in the saving rate for the bottom 95 percent after the mid-1980s was roughly equal to the cumulative shortfall of their income due to rising inequality relative to a period in which the income share of the bottom 95 percent was remarkably stable.
Counterfactual predictions are speculative. But the results here suggest that rising inequality contributed significantly to the financial instability of American households during the Consumer Age. This interpretation adds to a growing research literature that links changes in the US income distribution to macroeconomic instability, helping to illuminate the sources of the Great Recession.
1 Furthermore, the economy has now lost the demand growth created by the spending and borrowing behaviors of the lower 95 percent prior to 2007. We argue that this fact is an important explanation for the stagnant recovery of the US economy since 2009. In the final section of this paper, we propose some measures of the size of this effect and consider its implications for future US macroeconomic conditions.
I. INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND CONSUMPTION BEHAVIOR

A. The Paradox of Rising Inequality and Higher Consumer Spending
A thread of macroeconomic thinking, going back decades, identifies a basic challenge arising from growing inequality. 2 This approach begins with the assumption that high-income people (usually associated with profit earners) spend a lower share of their income than those of more modest means (typically wage earners). In this case, rising inequality creates a drag on demand that could lead to unemployment and even secular stagnation if demand is not generated from other sources.
1 In a comment on Cynamon and Fazzari (2008) , Korty (2008) pointed out the likely role of unequal income growth in rising household debt. In a prescient and wide-ranging paper, Barba and Pivetti (2009) identified the same aggregate trends laid out in this paper and hypothesized about the likely breakdown between lower and higher income segments of the household sector. Kumhof and Ranciere (2010) construct a theoretical model that links inequality, household debt, and financial crises. Palley (2012) and Setterfield (2012) consider the macroeconomic consequences of a persistent deviation of wage growth from productivity growth. Van Treeck and Sturn (2012) provide an extensive survey of research on income inequality and the forces that culminated in the Great Recession. 2 Recent work on this topic and very extensive references to earlier research can be found in Setterfield (2010) . 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 and stable growth come from? Aggregate data identify two secular sources of demand growth in this period. First, American households in the aggregate increased their spending relative to income. This trend is reflected by the widely recognized decline of the household saving rate between the mid-1980s and the beginning of the Great Recession (see, for example, Kopcke, Munnell, and Cook 1991) . Second, the US experienced a significant boom in home construction during this period, especially since the early 1990s.
To assess the effect of these factors, we adjust the standard NIPA data on household spending and income to more closely reflect the actual demand for new production emanating from the household sector, as opposed to the service flow of consumption. The motivation and details of this procedure are described in Cynamon and Fazzari (2013) . 4 In summary, we remove the part of housing rent from NIPA consumption that does not reflect direct purchase of newly produced goods and services, and we replace the rent component with new residential construction. For owner-occupied housing, the rent adjustment subtracts gross value added (implicit rent minus the cost of intermediate goods attributed to home ownership). This item does not represent a cash payment in any sense. For tenant-occupied housing we also exclude gross value added, less a small adjustment for wage costs paid in the rental housing sector. Of course, tenant rent is a cash payment, but we treat it as a personal transfer rather than the purchase of newly produced output since the rent paid to landlords does not directly purchase new production. In contrast to rent, the construction of new residential structures (both single and multi family) clearly is an important and volatile component of demand. For consistency, we also adjust disposable income and personal transfers, as described in Cynamon and Fazzari (2013) . Broadly speaking, these adjustments result in a treatment of housing that is just like any other consumer durable: output and income occur at the time something is produced, not when it is used. Demand occurs when a newly produced item is sold. 5 In what follows, we refer to these new measures as "adjusted" to distinguish them from the standard measures in the NIPA data. Figure 2 shows our adjusted measure of demand relative to spendable income of the household sector. 6 This information, along with the strong trend toward inequality shown in 4 See, also, Mason and Jayadev (2012) who make similar adjustments for related purposes. 5 In principle, this concept suggests that when measuring demand, we distinguish between new housing sold and new housing produced. In the absence of aggregate data on the unsold inventory of newly produced housing, however, we assume that housing production adds directly to demand. 6 Spendable income is NIPA disposable income minus the NIPA definition of personal transfer payments. This measure is the NIPA equivalent of the adjusted disposable income concept from Cynamon and Fazzari (2013 
B. Disaggregated Estimates of Household Demand
We examine the differences in demand between the bottom 95 percent and the top 5 percent of the US household income distribution. We choose this split for two reasons. First, we can use some existing disaggregated data, as discussed below, at a 95 percent-5 percent split. Second, a detailed analysis of changing leverage rates across income groups (see the discussion around 110% 1959 1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 7 We use these saving rates and NIPA personal outlay data to estimate the NIPA consumption measure for each income group and we then apply the household demand adjustment discussed in the previous subsection to each group.
The resulting estimates of the demand rate, equal to adjusted spending divided by adjusted spendable income, are presented in 
C. How Can We Make Sense of the Behavior of the 95 Percent?
We believe that an approach capable of making sense of consumer decision making must address the complexity of household spending and financing decisions. As Cynamon and Fazzari (2008, 2012a) explain, households often need to make consumption and saving decisions that require only small adjustments in plans when the outside world delivers small deviations from prior expectation, but that the preferences that underpin those plans are generally mediated by more fundamental-perhaps largely implicit-decisions about the communities that they reside in, the folks that they socialize with, and lifestyles (as distinct from consumption bundles) that they strive to attain. These considerations dictate the consumption and financial choices that are modeled for them by the people they look to for external validation. Household decision makers face uncertainty about future labor income, job security, asset market returns, and longevity, all of which muddle their choices about how much to spend and save and how to allocate their savings among asset options. At the same time, the choices that they make about their reference groups dictate what they view as normal, an important force for anchoring their expectations in light of their ignorance and uncertainty about the future.
This approach is similar to that of the sticky information expectations literature in macroeconomics. A number of recent papers have introduced the notion of "rational inattentive"
behavior to describe how consumers and producers update their information sets and make new plans only sporadically Reis (2006a, b) . In those models, information diffuses slowly because acquiring information and integrating it into new plans are costly actions. Recently, Carroll (2003 , 2006 put forward a specific form of "sticky information" expectations that explains how households form their expectations about the economic environment. In our view, it is not only expectations about exogenous variables that households must update, but also their understanding of their own financial position, available goods and services, and even, to some extent, their preferences.
Our goal is to explain why consumers in the bottom 95 percent chose to raise their consumption-income ratio and take on the debt that was made available to them, but we pause here to note some of the supply-side explanations for the increased availability of credit over the past thirty years. These factors included the new information technology that made it easier to obtain information on prospective borrowers (e.g., credit scores) and thereby reduced the formerly prohibitive costs of underwriting unsecured lines of credit (credit cards). Tax law changes have also affected the market for household debt. In particular, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 eliminated the income tax deduction for most categories of interest expense, but retained the deductibility of home mortgage interest, which made it advantageous to refinance nondeductible loans with home equity lines of credit. As these facilities became broadly available to households, borrowing against home equity became an easily accessible source of purchasing power for homeowners.
It is difficult for standard models, most notably the life cycle model, to account for the long decline in the saving rate starting in the early 1980s. A multitude of economists propose explanations including wealth effects, permanent income hypothesis (high expected income) effect, and demographics, but along with many researchers, we find those explanations unsatisfying. 8 We argue that the decline in the saving rate can best be understood by recognizing the important role of uncertainty in household decision making and the powerful influence of the reference groups to which those household decision makers turn for guidance.
We propose that households develop an identity over time that helps them make consumption decisions by informing them about the consumption bundle that is normal. 9 We define the consumption norm as the standard of consumption an individual considers normal based on his or her identity (Cynamon and Fazzari 2008, 2012a) . The household decision makers weigh two questions most heavily in making consumption and financial decisions. expectations. These behaviors persisted not because they were ultimately sustainable, but because they were validated month-by-month and year-by-year. People could observe their neighbors and media role models and internalize rising consumption norms increasingly disconnected from their own disposable incomes. 10 For an extended period, middle-income households were able to drive their consumption rates well above 100 percent without adverse consequences in any generalized sense and without deviating from norms of behavior they observed in their reference groups. As the Great Recession demonstrated, however, the trends highlighted in Figure 3 were ultimately on a collision course with reality, a topic to which we now turn.
II. UNSUSTAINABLE HOUSEHOLD FINANCE AND THE GREAT RECESSION
The rising rate of household spending out of income in the bottom 95 percent of the income distribution during the Consumer Age, in a sense, rescued the US economy from possible demand stagnation caused by rising inequality. This section considers how this unusual history set the stage for the Great Recession and the painfully slow recovery that has followed.
A. Household Debt Leverage
As the spending rate for the bottom 95 percent of households increased while the disposable incomes of this group stagnated, it is hardly surprising that debt leverage increased significantly. 1959 1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 
B. What Caused the Great Recession?
These results help to explain how the Consumer Age sowed the seeds of the Great Recession.
Spending outside of the top 5 percent of the income distribution rose sharply relative to spendable income starting in the mid-1980s. The US economy came to rely on this demand growth to drive production and employment upward. But higher spending outside of the top of 11 The same conclusion holds if one extends the final point of the calculations to the most recently available SCF data from 2010, but the size of the difference between the bottom 95 percent and top 5 percent groups declines. We consider extending the comparison to 2010 misleading for two reasons. First, the Consumer Age ends with the Great Recession in 2008 and the household sector enters a period of deleveraging. Second, the primary reason for the jump in the debt-income ratio for the rich in 2010 is that their income declines. As Figure 5 shows, this is typical behavior in a recession (also see the jumps in 1992 and 2004 in the ratio for the top 5 percent that can be associated with recessions). Although some aspects of this story are fairly widespread in analyses based on aggregate data, our results provide direct evidence that the financial instability did indeed emerge from a particular part of the household sector, those outside of the top 5 percent whose income share declined in the Consumer Age period. This finding directly links the macroeconomic dynamics that caused the Great Recession to the trend toward rising income inequality.
Additionally, we consider an important quantitative question: how large was the unsustainable part of the demand coming out of the bottom 95 percent on the eve of the Great Recession? In order to measure the unsustainable part of the demand of the bottom 95 percent, we must suppose first that some amount of spending is sustainable based on the household's reasonable expectation of an ongoing ability to finance that level of consumption indefinitely, and we must estimate that amount and compare it to actual spending. We approach this problem by establishing a benchmark saving rate and comparing actual saving to that benchmark.
Establishing this benchmark requires some assumptions, and the results are sensitive to those assumptions. In a survey of 156 financial planners and educators Greninger et al. (1996) identified 10 percent as the median recommended ratio of savings to disposable income for a typical family. 12 A study based on data from the 1992 wave of the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) attempted to estimate how much households need to set aside in order to maintain their living standards into retirement and found the desired saving rate for those households with incomes between $15,000 and $100,000 was about 14 percent (Bernheim et al. 2000) . There is no universally optimal saving rate for households: "retirement planning should mirror individual psychological preferences," and "is complex and uncertain" (Skinner 2007) . While providing some guidance, neither a widely accepted rule of thumb nor a model dependent on demographic characteristics and expectations of individual households can provide a satisfactory benchmark saving rate; but our goal is not to assert that a single ratio of saving to disposable income reflects the optimal rate for every household, it is to determine a rate of saving that appears to be sustainable in the aggregate.
In this case, historical behavior may be the best guide. History, especially when it is reasonably stable, also can be interpreted as reflecting norms of behavior that guide individual decision making, as described earlier. The evidence presented so far implies that household financial circumstances were stable through the early 1980s. Figure 4 shows that aggregate household debt was a stable share of disposable income through about 1984. Figure 2 shows that the aggregate household demand rate was stable, also through about 1984. And the income share of the bottom 95 percent was approximately stable through 1982 (see Figure 1) . We therefore assume that the early 1980s period provides a useful benchmark for sustainable household finance. Let us consider how the saving rates of the two income groups deviated from that benchmark in the Consumer Age decades. Figure 6 shows that the aggregate adjusted saving rate has no discernible trend through about 1984 before it declines substantially. The disaggregated data begin in 1989. From that point, Figure 6 shows that the trend decline in the saving rate was driven almost exclusively by falling saving in the bottom 95 percent income group. The saving rate of the top 5 percent was volatile, but without any trend during the period for which we have data.
13 13 The disaggregated saving rate data in Figure 6 are closely related to the disaggregated demand data from Figure  3 , but they are not the exact mirror image of one another. That is because saving is computed by subtracting personal transfers, not just demand, from spendable income. The largest part of personal transfers, particularly with the approach from Cynamon and Fazzari (2013) , is interest payments on debt, which accumulated for the bottom 95 percent as their borrowing grew in the Consumer Age. Based on the data in Figure 6 , we assume a benchmark saving rate for the lower 95 percent of 7.0 percent. To compute this benchmark, we need to account for the decline in the aggregate saving rate prior to the beginning of the disaggregated data in 1989. The average adjusted saving rate for the lower 95 percent was 4.28 percent between 1989 and 1991. The average aggregate saving rate fell from 7.37 percent (1979-84) to 4.61 percent (1989-91) . We assume that the saving rate for the lower 95 percent fell by the same amount as the aggregate saving rate from 1985 to 1989. 14 We therefore estimate the benchmark for the lower 95 percent as 4.28 percent plus the drop in the aggregate saving rate (7.37 percent less 4.61 percent), which rounds to 7.0 percent. Note that this benchmark is substantially less than the 10 percent to 12 percent recommended saving rate from Greninger et al. (1996) . If the appropriate benchmark saving rate that delivers sustainable balance sheet dynamics for the bottom 95 percent is higher than 7.0 percent, the results discussed in the next paragraph will be even larger.
14 Note that for the period for which we have data for both the aggregate and lower 95 percent saving rates, the lower 95 percent rate almost always falls more quickly. So linking the decline in the lower 95 percent rate between the benchmark period and 1989 likely understates the actual decline in the lower 95 percent saving rate. 15% 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 Bottom 95% Top 5% Aggregate
The actual saving rate for the lower 95 percent was below the benchmark throughout the entire Consumer Age, and often substantially negative. This shortfall in saving contributed to the run-up in household debt, and it has driven a large share of US households into financial distress. 15 Figure 7 presents data that helps assess the effect of the falling saving rate for the lower 95 percent on the overall economy. It shows the demand that would have been withdrawn if the lower 95 percent were to restore their saving rate back to the benchmark level. The measurement unit in Figure 7 is the share of adjusted GDP. Estimated demand loss to restore benchmark saving for the lower 95 percent 15 Mason and Jayadev (2012) also point out that high real interest rates and low inflation contribute to the rise in household leverage over this period, particularly the period before 2000. 16 We adjust the GDP measure to correspond to the housing expenditure adjustment described earlier. Adjusted GDP differs from the standard NIPA concept of GDP because both implicit and explicit rent on pre-existing housing are not considered part of the economy's production of final goods and services. 
III. DEMAND GROWTH IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE GREAT RECESSION
The US economy had to confront two broad macroeconomic problems as of 2007. First, we estimate about 8 percent of aggregate demand was based on unsustainable borrowing of households in the bottom 95 percent of the income distribution. Second, much of the growth of demand since the mid-1980s was generated by the unsustainable lend-and-spend dynamic of the Consumer Age that presumably has been lost. This section considers the implications of these problems for the macroeconomic recovery going forward and suggests how they may be addressed by public policy.
Clearly, the consumption and residential construction generated by a declining saving rate of the bottom 95 percent was bound to stop growing and likely to start shrinking. Our calculations estimate that this measure of the saving rate became negative in 1999, and stayed From a conventional macroeconomics perspective, this problem might not seem particularly daunting over the medium term as higher household saving ultimately leads to higher business investment. We do not believe, however, that this process will be effective in leading demand out of its post-recession stagnation. The loanable funds process that channels higher saving into investment through lower interest rates assumes that the economy operates at full employment. In our actual circumstances, five years after the beginning of the Great Recession, this is clearly not the case. Furthermore, interest rates have already fallen to historic lows and have remained there for some time, but business investment has yet to attain even its pre-recession level, much less the much higher level necessary to put a significant dent in the consumption and housing demand shortfall. Should another source of demand initiate a robust recovery, business investment would likely follow and help support demand. But it is unlikely to play the leading role in filling the hole left by the end of the Consumer Age, an interpretation consistent with the historical evidence presented by Barbosa-Filho et al. (2008) who show that investment has not led historical US recoveries.
The results presented here raise the question of whether adequate demand growth to approach full employment can be attained in a sustainable way with the kind of income inequality that now prevails in the US economy. There are a variety of possible solutions for the shortfall of demand growth in the aftermath of the Great Recession, including rising exports, a higher share of government demand, and a renewed lend-and-spend dynamic for the household sector that may lead to another bout with financial fragility. The best outcome, however, is likely to be attained if the trend toward greater inequality is reversed, or at least stabilized.
Redistributive tax policy could help to meet this goal, as discussed at the end of Cynamon and Fazzari (2012b) , although direct redistribution is politically contentious in the US. A more attractive alternative is the "golden rule" for good economic performance proposed by Setterfield (2012) , that wage growth across the income distribution keep up with productivity growth (see, also, Palley 2012). It is far from obvious how to implement policies that would reach this goal, but there may be no other way to generate the demand necessary to escape stagnation in a sustainable way.
APPENDIX A. DISAGGREGATION OF NIPA SAVING AND CONSUMPTION
There are three published aggregate measures of saving by the US personal sector, which includes households and nonprofit organizations that serve households. First, the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) publishes the NIPA personal saving rate calculated with data from the national income and product accounts using the "income and expenditure concept" (IE).
This approach defines saving as the residual obtained from subtracting personal outlays (equal to consumption plus personal transfers) from disposable income. Second, the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) publishes the personal saving rate calculated with data from the Flow of Funds Accounts (FFA) using the "balance sheet concept" (BS) that defines saving as the change in net wealth. As Guidolin and La Jeunesse (2007) point out, a bit of algebra involving the basic consumer budget constraint yields an equality in which change in net worth is on one side and the difference between income and expenditure is on the other. In other words, the IE and BS definitions would be identical in a world without measurement errors and problems with accounting definitions. In reality, the series published by the BEA and FRB regularly differ, and the FRB even publishes a third personal saving rate calculated with data from the Flow of Funds Accounts but using the income and expenditure concept. 17 While the BEA (NIPA) considers net acquisitions of consumer durable goods by households as personal consumption expenditures, the Board of Governors (FFA) considers the consumption of durable goods as part of gross private investment (Guidolin and La Jeunesse 2007) . We refer to these three measures as the NIPA/IE, FFA/BS, and FFA/IE measures, respectively, reflecting the data source and the concept.
From Mark Zandi, we received a data file generated by applying the procedure developed by Maki and Palumbo (2001) The next step is to adjust the FFA/IE series for the 5 percent and the 95 percent so that they aggregate to the NIPA/IE concept. Our method is to disaggregate the gap between the FFA/IE and NIPA/IE series and then to add the disaggregated differences to the 5 percent and 95 percent FFA/IE series. What results are personal saving rates for the 5 percent and 95 percent that aggregate to the NIPA/IE series with the CBO income shares. Because we attribute the bulk of the measurement difference between the two concepts to capital market activity, we adopt the CBO measure of capital gains share between the 5 percent and 95 percent (which adds to one) as a proxy for allocating the FFA/IE -NIPA/IE difference.
Because we have data on disposable income, shares of disposable income, and saving rates for our two household segments, we are able to solve for disposable personal income (DPI), saving, and outlays of the two segments (DPI -saving = outlays). In order to back out disaggregated personal consumption expenditures (PCE), we need one more identifying assumption. That is because personal outlays is composed of both PCE and transfers. We assume that both the 5 percent and the 95 percent have the same proportion of transfers (and consumption) to outlays. Thus, we use the aggregate ratios of transfers to outlays and consumption to outlays to decompose the outlays of the two household segments into their component parts.
